Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
Following is a question by Professor the Hon Chan Wing-kwong and a written reply by the Secretary for Health, Professor Lo Chung-mau, in the Legislative Council today (June 3):
Question:(ii) Displaying signages and broadcasting announcements in the airport arrival area and through airlines to urge passengers who have visited the DRC or Uganda within the past 21 days to proactively declare their travel history to the on-site staff of the DH for further health assessment; (iii) If an inbound traveller exhibits relevant symptoms and is assessed as a suspected case by the Port Health Division officers, arrangements will be made immediately to transfer the individual to the Hospital Authority Infectious Disease Centre (HAIDC) for isolation and treatment; (iv) Strengthening public awareness and health education efforts regarding Ebola disease at all boundary control points, including broadcasting announcements and posting posters to alert travellers; and (v) Providing the Airport Authority Hong Kong and airlines with the latest information on the virus, and urging airlines to remind their flight crews to strictly enforce established prevention and control measures if they identify suspected cases on their flights. The HA will continue to work closely with the CHP to monitor the development of the situation and review the relevant measures in a timely manner.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
LCQ6: Staff for 2025 Legislative Council General Election Question:
According to the Report on the 2025 Legislative Council General Election published by the Electoral Affairs Commission, the Registration and Electoral Office recruited a total of around 34 000 electoral staff in this election, who were mainly serving civil servants and full-time post-retirement service contract staff. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) of the respective expenditures incurred in recruiting serving civil servants and full-time post-retirement service contract staff to serve as the aforesaid electoral staff;
(2) of the staffing establishment for various electoral staff posts (including Presiding Officers, Deputy Presiding Officers, Assistant Presiding Officers, Counting Supervisors, Assistant Counting Supervisors, and other posts); the numbers of working days and hours for which such staff performed election-related duties; and
(3) given that there are views that the expenditure on the aforesaid election is too high, whether the Government will consider reviewing the practice of paying additional remuneration to civil servants participating in electoral work, so as to save public funds?
Reply:
President,
The general election for the eighth term Legislative Council (LegCo) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) was held on December 7, 2025. The election is the second LegCo general election after the HKSAR improved the electoral system and fully implemented the principle of “patriots administering Hong Kong”. It carries profound significance and is important to the steadfast and successful implementation of the “one country, two systems”, good governance, people’s livelihood and economic development in the HKSAR. At the election in December last year, voting was conducted in the 10 geographical constituencies (GCs), 28 functional constituencies, and the Election Committee constituency (ECC). To facilitate electors, various pioneering arrangements were introduced in the election, including extending polling hours to 16 hours, setting up designated polling stations and outreach polling stations for the convenience of various groups, and adding Near Boundary Polling Stations (NBPSs). The overall election process was smooth, with each stage, from issuing ballot papers, voting, and to counting, etc, being carried out in an orderly manner, successfully electing all 90 members to form the eighth term LegCo of the HKSAR.
The HKSAR Government has all along worked closely with the Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC) to enhance various electoral arrangements with the spirit of steadfastly seeking progress while ensuring stability, with a view to ensuring that all electoral processes would be conducted in a more efficient and user-friendly manner. To ensure the orderly conduct of the election and to facilitate electors in casting votes, the Registration and Electoral Office (REO) would fully prepare for each election, taking into account the actual circumstances including the number of electors at polling stations, venue size, and make reference to the experience in past elections, so to allocate appropriate and sufficient electoral staff for each procedural step.
As directed by the EAC, to prepare and conduct the general election for the eighth term LegCo, and in accordance with the electoral legislation, the REO appointed a total of approximately 34 000 serving civil servants and retired civil servants under the Post-retirement Service Contract Scheme (PRSC) as electoral staff, so to ensure that there would be sufficient manpower to carry out preparatory work across the territory on the day before the polling day, in addition to polling and counting work from the polling day to the following day. With the concerted efforts of all parties, the election was completed smoothly in a fair, open, honest, safe and orderly, efficient and user-friendly manner. The overall process was highly satisfactory.
In response to the question raised by Dr the Hon Junius Ho, I reply as follows –
(1) The total expenditure incurred by the REO for the appointment of about 34 000 electoral staff for the general election for the eighth term LegCo was around $236 million, and vast majority of the staff were serving civil servants. Only around 400 of the staff were retired civil servants. Most electoral staff were required to perform duties for three days, which covered the day before polling day, polling day and the day after.
(2) The REO appointed electoral staff for the general election for the eighth term LegCo in accordance with the relevant electoral legislation. These included about 810 Presiding Officers, about 1 980 Deputy Presiding Officers, about 7 360 Assistant Presiding Officers, about 90 Counting Supervisors, about 430 Assistant Counting Supervisors, and about 23 180 other staff such as Polling Officers and Counting Officers. These electoral staff performed duties in accordance with their appointed responsibilities and related electoral legislation and procedures. They were assigned to perform duties at ordinary polling-cum-counting stations, ECC polling station, NBPSs, dedicated polling stations, designated polling stations, outreach polling stations, consolidated main counting station, central counting station, as well as the Central Command Centre and the Statistical Information Centre, among whom there were staff responsible for providing logistical and emergency support, etc.
The working hours of electoral staff varied according to their assigned tasks and operational needs. In general, electoral staff are required to make preparations at the venue the day before polling day and the actual hours depend on the specific work requirements on site. Besides, taking electoral staff on duty at polling-cum-counting stations as an example, to tie in with the 16-hour polling hours at the election, their duty commenced at 6am on polling day to prepare for the opening of stations at 7.30am. After the close of poll at 11.30pm, they continued their duties until 4am on the following day to complete delivery, counting and other follow-up tasks. The total duty hours from polling day to the following day were about 22 hours, and working hours of most electoral staff spanned a period of three days.
In addition, electoral staff are required to attend a series of training during the preparation period for the election as provided by the REO in relation to the tasks assigned to them, e.g. briefing sessions, on-site training and simulated drills. Taking the example of staff on duty at polling stations, their practical training include practising ballot paper issuance procedures for the Electronic Poll Register, fallback plan for the system, so as to ensure that they would be able to carry out the ballot paper issuance procedures for the Electronic Poll Register in an orderly manner. The electoral staff were also required to be well-versed with work manuals and training materials prepared by the REO as well as be familiar with the professional knowledge in relation to their duties and various processes and operations in various stages of their work procedures to enhance their execution and response capabilities.
(3) The LegCo general election was a large scale, territory-wide election that the HKSAR placed utmost importance on. Its successful conduct in a fair, open, honest, safe and orderly, as well as efficient and user-friendly manner depended on the thorough preparations beforehand. To this end, the EAC must arrange appropriate and sufficient personnel to be in strict accordance with the electoral legislation and guidelines, so to ensure that electoral arrangements were impartial and independent.
The EAC has all along relied on civil servants as a source of stable, reliable, and experienced electoral staff. The prevailing appointment mechanism for electoral staff is conducive to the recruitment of suitable and experienced staff for performing electoral duties to ensure the smooth conduct of the electoral process.
The HKSAR Government, the EAC and the REO, with the spirit of steadfastly seeking progress while ensuring stability and upholding the principle of fiscal prudence, will continue to review and enhance electoral arrangements and resources utilisation, so as to ensure the effective use of public resources.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
LCQ17: Pension schemes for civil servants and judicial officers Question:
It has been reported that the Government has allocated $51.9 billion for the payment of pensions to eligible retired civil servants and judicial officers in the 2025-2026 financial year, an increase of $1.761 billion over the previous year. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) of the numbers of retired civil servants and judicial officers receiving pensions from the Government under (i) the civil service pension schemes and (ii) the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) Scheme or the Civil Service Provident Fund (CSPF) Scheme, as well as the respective pension expenditures, in each of the past five years;
(2) among the civil servants and judicial officers expected to retire this year, of the numbers of those who are under (i) the civil service pension schemes and (ii) the MPF Scheme or the CSPF Scheme, as well as the respective expenditures;
(3) of the respective numbers of retired civil servants and judicial officers receiving pensions from the Government in each year since 2021;
(4) of the number of cases in which the Government ceased the payment of monthly pensions to retired civil servants and judicial officers following their death in each of the past five years; and
(5) whether there is a mechanism in place to ensure the Government’s immediate cessation of the payment of monthly pensions to retired civil servants and judicial officers upon their death; if so, of the details; whether there have been any instances in the past five years where monthly pensions continued to be paid to such personnel after their death; if so, whether the reasons have been investigated, and what follow-up or remedial measures the Government has taken?
Reply:
President,
At present, civil servants appointed on terms which attract pension benefits are confined to those who were appointed before June 1, 2000. For civil servants appointed on or after June 1 ,2000, the Government will make contributions according to their terms of appointment under the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) Schemes Ordinance or Civil Service Provident Fund (CSPF) Scheme during their actual period of service. Our response to the five parts of the question is as follows:
(1) and (3) The number of retired civil servants and judicial officers receiving pensions and the total expenditure on pension payments made to them in the past five financial years are set out below:
Financial year(as at the end of the respective financial year)(including gratuities and pensions) ($ million) The total number of officers appointed on terms under the MPF Scheme or the CSPF Scheme and the total MPF and CSPF contributions made for eligible officers in the past five financial years are set out below:
Financial year(as at the end of the respective financial year)($ million) Under the CSPF Scheme, the Government’s contribution rate increases progressively depending on the years of service of the civil servants. As of now, all the officers who were appointed to the civil service on or after June 1, 2000 have yet to reach the required years of service to be eligible for the maximum Government’s contribution rate. Hence, the total expenditure on MPF and CSPF contributions will increase not only with the increase in the number of civil servants appointed under the Schemes, but also with the increase in the years of service of civil servants.
(2) Pension schemes and MPF Scheme/CSPF Scheme are two different forms of retirement protection. Under the former, officers will be receiving retirement benefits after retirement, and will not receive pension payment while in service; whereas under the latter, the Government makes contributions to their retirement benefits while the officers are in service. The number of retiring civil servants and judicial officers receiving pensions in 2026-27 is estimated to be 5 330, involving an estimated expenditure of about $16,000 million in 2026-27. The number of retiring civil servants and judicial officers appointed on terms under the MPF Scheme or the CSPF Scheme in the same financial year is estimated to be about 1 000. The number of retiring civil servants and judicial officers appointed under the MPF Scheme or CSPF Scheme is relatively small as most of the officers who were appointed to the civil service on or after June 1, 2000 under the two Schemes have not reached their retirement age. Under the MPF and the CSPF Schemes, the expenditure on Government contributions are made throughout the period of the officers’ service. The monthly contributions made by the Government as employer (including the mandatory and voluntary contributions) are made to the MPF contribution accounts of the officers concerned, who would make investment choices of their own. Therefore, no additional Government expenditure will be incurred when those officers retire.
(4) The number of cases in which monthly pension payments to retired civil servants and judicial officers receiving pensions have been ceased due to their death in the past five financial years is set out below:
Financial Year(5) According to the existing requirement, upon the death of a pensioner, the next of kin of the deceased pensioner should inform the Treasury as early as possible for arrangement of immediate cessation of pension payment. If the next of kin has failed to make a report in a timely manner resulting in overpayment of pensions by the Government, the Treasury will request the bank to directly recover the overpaid amount from the deceased pensioner’s bank account, or request the next of kin to provide details of the estate administrator to recover the overpaid amount. In addition, the Treasury has in place appropriate measures to ensure there is no overpayment of pensions by the Government, which include:
(i) pensioners are generally required to complete and return annually a Declaration of Entitlement to Pension Benefits, either witnessed by a third party or digitally signed via “iAM Smart+”, to substantiate their continued entitlement to pensions. If the declaration is not returned by the specified date, payment of pensions will be temporarily suspended until receipt of the declaration;
(ii) selected pensioners are required to provide valid supporting documents to the Treasury for sampling checks on a regular basis; and Issued at HKT 15:00
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4
Following is a question by the Hon Carmen Kan and a written reply by the Acting Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Joseph Chan, in the Legislative Council today (June 3):
Question:
It has been reported that recently, some members of the public who have lost their identity cards have fallen victim to identity theft. After opening bank accounts online or in person, fraudsters have impersonated these members of the public to apply for loans and telecommunications services, or even engage in other criminal activities. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) of the fraudsters’ major means of identity theft (e.g. fraudulent offline use of physical identity documents and remote digital identity theft), and the nature of cases consequent to such acts (e.g. online shopping and borrowing), their numbers and pecuniary losses incurred over the past three years, with a breakdown in tabular form;
(2) whether the Government has grasped the situation where the credit scores of members of the public have been adversely affected due to identity theft over the past three years; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; whether the authorities will consider requiring the Credit Reference Platform “Credit Data Smart” or its participating institutions to provide relevant data to relevant regulatory bodies and the Police for follow-up;
(3) given that members of the public are currently able to access the online services of various government departments or bodies through “iAM Smart” and “iAM Smart+” which is equipped with a digital signing function, whether the Government has compiled respective statistics on the data application scenarios, data scope and popularization rates of various services of “iAM Smart” and “iAM Smart+” (e.g. using the public services provided by all government departments as the denominator in the calculation);
(4) given that members of the public will authorize government departments and bodies to retrieve user data (e.g. identity card numbers, photographs and contact information) when using “iAM Smart” and “iAM Smart+”, how the Government will strike a balance between providing facilitation to both the public and businesses and preventing identity theft, with details of relevant measures set out by type of government department and body;
(5) as it has been reported that in the field of fintech, government raw data may be referred to as “authoritative data sources”; Mainland financial institutions can connect to the Ministry of Public Security’s “National Citizen Identity Information Centre”, and when banks upload customers’ identity card numbers, names and photographs, the system can instantly compare such data against the Ministry of Public Security’s database, which will provide feedback on the authenticity of identity documents and facial matching results with enhanced effectiveness in fraud prevention, whether the Government will, with reference to this approach, adopt an open attitude towards providing “authoritative data sources” to financial institutions (e.g. allowing relevant departments and the Digital Policy Office to share suspicious intelligence with financial institutions and conduct identity verification); if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
(6) if the Government has no plan to fully open up “authoritative data sources” to financial institutions, what alternative measures are in place to assist financial institutions in conducting customer identity verification and due diligence, as well as the costs incurred by these measures (e.g. whether the authorities will consider opening up “authoritative data sources” first to digital banks that generally have no physical branch for face-to-face customer verification, so as to assist them in verifying customer identities); and
(7) whether the Government has a clear understanding of the technologies used by public bodies and financial institutions to prevent identity theft without its opening up of “authoritative data sources”, and the annual investment in the research and development as well as maintenance of such technologies; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?
Reply:
President,
To address the issue of identify theft concerning members of the public, the Government, the financial regulators and the industry have been monitoring market and technology trends closely, and have been maintaining close communication and intelligence sharing. If crimes involving the production of counterfeit Hong Kong identity cards (HKIC) or the use of false identities are detected, the law enforcement agencies take proactive enforcement actions.
After consulting the Security Bureau, the Innovation, Technology and Industry Bureau, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), and the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA), the reply to the seven parts of the question is as follows:
(1) The Hong Kong Police Force carried out multiple arrest operations over the past year related to the making of false HKICs or the use of false identities, including Operation “SILVERHALL” launched in October 2025, which successfully dismantled a local fraud syndicate. The syndicate used deepfake technology to replace the portraits on HKICs which had been reported as lost, and successfully passed the facial recognition verification of online banking systems, opened 19 bank accounts, and used those identity cards to apply for loans and credit cards, involving approximately HK$220,000. In that operation, the Police arrested 23 persons, including the mastermind and core members of the syndicate, as well as holders of stooge accounts, which had been used to launder or handle crime proceeds totalling more than HK$190 million.
The Police does not maintain a breakdown of the primary methods by which fraudsters misused identities across all cases.
(2) When members of the public enquire about inaccuracies in their personal credit records held by a credit reference agency, the relevant credit provider or consumer credit reference agency will handle the matter in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraphs 3.19 and 3.20 of the Code of Practice on Consumer Credit Data, including verifying the information, following up with the data provider where necessary, and making corrections as soon as possible if the information is confirmed to be inaccurate.
These procedures effectively prevent or address situations where identity theft affects an individual’s credit record. Members of the public may also make use of credit alert services provided by consumer credit reference agencies as needed, to identify any inaccurate information or other suspicious circumstances early, and take follow-up action in a timely manner.
In cases of suspected identity theft, relevant institutions will verify the information and follow up in accordance with established risk management and compliance procedures, and cooperate with law enforcement agencies for further investigation if necessary.
The HKMA and consumer credit reference agencies do not maintain statistics on cases involving suspected identity theft that affect personal credit records.
(3) As of the end of May 2026, “iAM Smart” has registered over 4.5 million users, more than 80 per cent of whom use “iAM Smart+”. Currently, “iAM Smart” has achieved the goal of a “single portal for online government services” (i.e. all online government services have adopted “iAM Smart”), enabling access to over 1 400 online services provided by the Government and public and private organisations, as well as government e-forms. Citizens can use various functions of “iAM Smart”/”iAM Smart+”, including identity authentication, “e-Me” form filling and digital signing, etc, to log in to and access various related services, such as viewing and paying bills, registering for and logging in to the eMPF Platform, checking personal credit records, applying for loans, and opening accounts with banks and financial institutions online.
(4) As a critical digital infrastructure, the “iAM Smart” platform has consistently adhered to the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance to protect citizens’ personal data. “iAM Smart” will transfer users’ personal data to online service providers only with the user’s prior consent. The personal data transferred may vary depending on the requirements of online service providers. It mainly includes users’ HKIC data (such as HKIC number, Chinese and English names, date of birth, gender, etc) and personal data voluntarily provided by the user in “e-ME” profile, including residential address, email address, phone number.
Personal data in the “iAM Smart” system are encrypted using prevailing internationally recognised and accepted Advanced Encryption Standard, and stored in government data centre facilities. During transmission of data over the Internet, Transport Layer Security is also adopted to encrypt data to ensure data security and integrity. The “iAM Smart” platform was successfully accredited with ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and ISO/IEC 27701:2019 international standard certifications in 2023. This shows that “iAM Smart” services have achieved international standards in information security and personal data protection.
To tackle evolving security threats, the Digital Policy Office (DPO) continuously enhances the overall system security of “iAM Smart”, including adopting AI in deepfake detection during the facial recognition process, to ensure that selfie images are captured from real persons (instead of AI-generated fakes). We also utilise AI log analytics and monitoring techniques for anomaly detection to proactively identify and swiftly address potential system issues. Furthermore, to strengthen cybersecurity and guard against identity theft, the DPO introduced the “Step-up Authentication” function in “iAM Smart”, allowing online services to conduct additional identity verification for their users during key processes (e.g. bank account opening, remote authentication). Apart from the AI-powered anti-deepfake technology, “Step-up Authentication” function also supports the use of Near Field Communication (i.e. NFC) function of users’ mobile phones to read the identity card’s chip data. By cross-referencing data against the records of the Immigration Department in real time, it further enhances the security of identity authentication. Meanwhile, we engage red team to identify hidden security risks of the system, and arrange annual audits by independent third-party consultants to guard against information security risks.
(5) to (7) In the banking sector, the HKMA has all along required banks to adopt multiple layers of controls to authenticate customers’ identities and guard against fraud. These include the use of technology solutions to verify the authenticity of identity cards and facial recognition technology to confirm customers’ identities. The existing measures have been effective at validating customers’ identities. However, in view of evolving fraud tactics and technological developments, banks must also continually review and strengthen the relevant controls and identity verification processes.
In this regard, the HKMA is working closely with the DPO, banks, and the stored value facility industry and plans to progressively integrate “iAM Smart”‘s Step-up Authentication function into critical processes. Through leveraging the function to conduct facial recognition and reading of identity card chips, fraudsters can be prevented from using fake or stolen identity documents. This will provide another layer of protection to the customer identity authentication process. The HKMA is engaging with the industry on the arrangements for the first phase of implementation covering remote account opening. The plan is to commence testing within 2026 and extend relevant arrangements to other critical processes in phases, following a risk-based approach.
With respect to the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF), since all administration work of MPF schemes is centrally handled by the eMPF Platform, the MPFA is able to identify potential connections among suspicious cases more effectively and take follow-up action as early as possible. Furthermore, since December 2025, all online applications to register for the eMPF Platform must be submitted via “iAM Smart” as a measure to combat impersonation of MPF scheme members by criminals. MPFA has also required MPF trustees to put in place robust risk management and monitoring mechanisms, and to assist in conducting due diligence on cases referred by the eMPF Platform, for detecting and preventing fraudulent activities and strengthening the protection of scheme members’ interests.
In the securities sector, under the SFC’s Guideline on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism, licensed corporations must conduct customer due diligence before establishing a business relationship, verifying identity using reliable and independent documents, data, or information. For non face to face account opening, licensed corporations must take additional measures to mitigate risks associated with the absence of physical identity verification (e.g. impersonation risk). Since the launch of “iAM Smart”, the SFC has accepted the use of “iAM Smart” by intermediaries for identity verification during account opening, helping to prevent identity theft and reduce impersonation risk. “iAM Smart” provides a reliable and independent source of Hong Kong resident identity information, allowing intermediaries to verify customers through its authentication function.
Nevertheless, “iAM Smart” is different in nature from the Chinese Mainland’s “National Citizen Identity Information Service Center system”. Registration for “iAM Smart” is voluntary, meaning its Step-up Authentication function can only be used where the customer has registered for “iAM Smart” and consented to its use. The Government will continue to monitor technological developments and the operational needs of the industry, and will keep reviewing and optimising related policies, while fully protecting personal data privacy and complying with Hong Kong’s legal framework. These include exploring the further use of the authentication capabilities of “iAM Smart”, and collaborating with various financial regulators to strengthen cross industry identity verification mechanisms, thereby more effectively preventing identity theft.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
LCQ7: Pilot Study on Newborn Screening for Inborn Errors of Metabolism Question:
It is learnt that the Hospital Authority (HA) launched the Pilot Study on Newborn Screening for Inborn Errors of Metabolism (screening programme) in 2015 to test newborns for congenital hereditary diseases with a view to early identification and treatment. Subsequently, the HA regularised the screening programme in eight public hospitals, and extended it to two private hospitals from the middle of last year. the HA indicated that the screening programme would be extended to more private hospitals as early as this year. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) whether it knows: (i) the additional resources (including manpower, equipment and consumables, such as reagents) used since the screening programme was extended to two private hospitals last year; (ii) the timetable for further extending the screening programme to other private hospitals and the estimated additional resources required;
(2) whether it knows: (i) the number and proportion of congenital hereditary diseases detected under the screening programme in each of the past five years, as well as the number and proportion of cases among newborns screened where developmental defects or delays were prevented or improved through early treatment; (ii) the estimated number of additional cases that can be screened out annually following the extension of the screening programme to private hospitals;
(3) whether the authorities or the HA has put in place countermeasures or prepared additional resources and manpower to avoid a backlog of cases arising from the expansion of the service coverage of the screening programme; and
(4) whether the authorities or the HA has established key performance indicators for the screening programme to assess the effectiveness of the professional support (such as timely counselling and treatment) provided to parents and affected infants; if so, of the details?
Reply:
President,
Newborn screening is a core public health prevention measure designed to assist in the early identification of high-risk cases of certain hereditary and rare diseases through advanced medical testing. This allows newborns to receive timely and appropriate treatment, thereby reducing the long-term burden on families and the overall public healthcare system.
Since 2015, the Department of Health, through the Hospital Authority (HA), has conducted the Pilot Study on Newborn Screening for Inborn Errors of Metabolism (IEM) in public hospitals. The Newborn Screening Programme for Inborn Errors of Metabolism (Screening Programme) was regularised on October 1, 2020, and further extended to all public hospitals with obstetric departments under the HA. Currently, over 99 per cent of babies born in public hospitals receive this screening. Under the Screening Programme, in addition to basic check-ups provided for babies born in public hospitals, the HA also provides screening for 30 types of IEM, Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID) and Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA). The HA also has a mechanism in place to regularly review whether additional diseases should be included in the screening. The Screening Programme has been implemented in public hospitals for years. From its regularisation on October 1, 2020, to the end of December 2025, over 100 000 babies born in public hospitals have been screened, and more than 40 rare disease cases have been successfully identified. This demonstrates that screening is effective in identifying patients and arranging for their treatment early.
To provide more comprehensive health protection for babies born in Hong Kong, the Government proposed in the 2024 Policy Address to extend the coverage of the HA’s newborn screening service to babies born in private hospitals. Since 2025, babies born in private hospitals participating in the Screening Programme are eligible for free screening services, provided that at least one of their parents is a Hong Kong resident.
In consultation with the HA, the consolidated reply to the question raised by Dr the Hon David Lam is as follows:
(1) and (3) As at May 2026, the HA has signed co-operation agreements with six private hospitals, namely Gleneagles Hospital Hong Kong, Hong Kong Sanatorium and Hospital, St. Paul’s Hospital, St. Teresa’s Hospital, Union Hospital, and Matilda International Hospital, and has launched newborn screening services for these hospitals. The HA will provide screening services covering 30 types of IEM, SCID, and SMA for babies born in the aforementioned private hospitals. The HA will continue to communicate with private hospitals interested in joining the Programme to extend the Screening Programme to more private hospitals.
Participation in the Screening Programme is voluntary. Other private hospitals may decide for themselves whether and when to join, and the actual testing demand also depends on the participation rates of the private hospitals and parents of newborns. For babies born in private hospitals that have not yet joined the Screening Programme, parents can also arrange for them to receive screening services provided by private healthcare institutions. The HA currently does not have statistics on the coverage of screening services for babies born in private hospitals, but will, depending on actual circumstances, collect relevant data for reference in the future.
At present, the HA can provide a service capacity of approximately 25 000 newborn screening tests per year, which is sufficient to meet current and additional testing demand. The HA will flexibly allocate resources according to actual participation rates to meet operational needs. If there is further growth in testing demand in the future, the HA will increase its service capacity accordingly.
(2) and (4) From the regularisation of the Screening Programme on October 1, 2020, to the end of December 2025, over 100 000 newborns have participated in the Programme. The number of confirmed cases and the corresponding confirmation rates are as follows:
Screening category(covering 30 conditions)(covered since October 2021)(covered since October 2023) Since the extension of the Screening Programme to private hospitals, the HA has provided screening for over 1 500 babies born in private hospitals, with no confirmed cases identified as at April 30, 2026.
Once a baby born in a public hospital is diagnosed with rare diseases through screening, the HA will follow up through a specialist team at the Hong Kong Children’s Hospital (HKCH) to ensure the baby receives necessary treatment as early as possible. The HKCH under the HA also operates a 24-hour designated hotline for private hospitals to make enquiries regarding the Screening Programme and to refer confirmed cases. The HKCH has a specialist team to provide one-stop diagnostic, treatment and follow-up services for babies confirmed with rare diseases as early as possible, as well as offering comprehensive support to their families. Issued at HKT 15:02
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
Marine Department launches Quality Bunker Operator Scheme to enhance service quality and transparency A spokesman for the MD said, “As an international maritime centre supported by our country, Hong Kong has a strategic location adjacent to major international fairways. Coupled with years of development in marine fuel bunkering, Hong Kong possesses rich experience and talent in the field. For many years, Hong Kong has consistently ranked as the seventh-largest bunkering port globally, the second-largest in our country, and the largest in the Greater Bay Area, providing reliable and competitive fuel bunkering services to ocean-going vessels from around the world. As the international shipping industry has an increasing demand for accuracy and transparency in bunkering services, service quality and measurement precision in bunkering operations have become important indicators of a bunkering port’s competitiveness. The Scheme will enhance bunkering accuracy and transparency, further enhancing the quality of Hong Kong’s bunkering services.”
Under the Scheme, bunker operators of traditional maritime fuel and biodiesel that install and use MFM systems on their bunker vessels, with the MFM systems inspected and certified by an accredited body in accordance with the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 22192 Standard or equivalent requirements, can apply to the MD for inclusion in the scheme’s “List of Quality Bunker Vessels”, provided they meet the relevant technical and operational requirements. Details of the bunker vessels successfully included in the List will be published on a dedicated page on the MD’s website for reference by shipping companies and relevant stakeholders.
Participation in the Scheme is voluntary. In addition to receiving recognition from the MD, participating bunker operators will benefit from enhanced corporate image and competitiveness through the adoption of MFM systems, thereby boosting customers’ confidence and helping to create new business opportunities.
“Comprehensive port services are one of Hong Kong’s key advantages as an international maritime centre. We will also mandate the use of MFM systems on all methanol bunker vessels this year to ensure that Hong Kong continues to provide high-quality bunkering services in the era of green maritime fuels,” the spokesman added.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
Interest rate of third interest payment for series of retail infrastructure bonds due 2027 The Hong Kong Monetary Authority, as representative of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, announced today (June 3) the relevant per annum interest rate for the third interest payment of the series of retail infrastructure bonds due 2027 (Issue Number: 03GB2712R; Stock Code: 4286) (the Retail Infrastructure Bonds) issued under the Infrastructure Bond Programme.
According to the Issue Circular dated November 26, 2024 for the Retail Infrastructure Bonds, the third interest payment of the Retail Infrastructure Bonds is scheduled to be made on June 17, 2026, and the relevant interest rate is scheduled to be determined and announced on June 3, 2026 as the higher of the prevailing Floating Rate and Fixed Rate.
On June 3, 2026, the Floating Rate and Fixed Rate are as follows:
Floating Rate: +1.47 per cent (Annex) Fixed Rate: +3.50 per cent
Based on the Floating Rate and Fixed Rate set out above, the relevant interest rate for the third interest payment is determined and announced as 3.50 per cent per annum. Issued at HKT 17:00
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4
Following is a question by the Hon Chan Hok-fung and a reply by the Secretary for Transport and Logistics, Ms Mable Chan, in the Legislative Council today (June 3):
Questions:
Quite a number of Tung Chung residents have relayed to me that, following the extension of operating hours of the South Runway to 2 am implemented by the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AA) in August last year, the problem of late-night aircraft noise has been aggravated significantly. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
(1) given the AA’s proposal to put the South Runway on standby at night, where possible, so as to avoid impact of aircraft noise on Tung Chung residents, whether the authorities know the utilisation rate of the South Runway between 12 midnight and 2 am over the past two years;
(2) given that the AA has undertaken to continuously monitor the impact of aircraft noise on nearby residents and to collaborate with the Civil Aviation Department to implement various noise mitigation measures, of the specific follow-up actions taken by both parties, such as whether additional long-term noise monitoring terminals will be set up in residential areas in the light of the development of Tung Chung New Town; if not, the reasons for that; and
(3) as there are views pointing out that, given the AA’s measure to shift cargo flights to the South Runway during the early hours to mitigate the impact on residents in the vicinity of Siu Lam and So Kwun Wat, there is a significant increase in the number of flights using the South Runway during such hours, bringing direct impact on the sleep quality of Tung Chung residents, whether the authorities have checked if the noise levels in the aforementioned locations during the early hours have exceeded the standards of excessive noise causing sleep disturbance recommended by the World Health Organization?
Reply:
President,
The Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) is one of the busiest international airports in the world. To consolidate and enhance Hong Kong’s status as an international aviation hub, the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AA) has been committed to enhancing the handling capacity and efficiency of the HKIA while taking into account environmental impacts, and will flexibly deploy the use of the three runways in light of the operational needs of the airport and flights.
With regard to the Three-Runway System (3RS) Project, the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) has approved the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report (including the Aircraft Noise Assessment Report) in accordance with the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance (Cap. 499) and issued the Environmental Permit (EP) to the AA. To minimise the impact of aircraft noise on residents living near the flight paths, the AA has always strictly complied with the conditions of the permit and relevant statutory requirements, conducted regular noise assessments to ensure that runway usage arrangements comply with the aircraft noise standards stipulated by the EPD, and maintained communication and provided explanations to relevant stakeholders (including the Islands Community Liaison Group).
My reply to questions raised by the Hon Chan Hok-fung is as follow:
(1) and (3) Under current arrangements, the HKIA operates with dual-runway between 11pm and 2am, where the South Runway is primarily used for departures, while also handling a small number of landings, mainly for freighters. During these hours, the traffic volume handled by the two runways is similar.
Regarding the potential health impacts that may be caused by aircraft noise, the AA has made reference to relevant guidelines, including those issued by the World Health Organization, when conducting the health impact assessment in the EIA study. The assessment indicates that both short-term and long-term potential health risks resulting from the operation of the 3RS are within acceptable levels. The AA will closely monitor the relevant latest international developments and adopt appropriate measures as and when necessary.
(2) The AA and the Civil Aviation Department (CAD) have all along attached great importance to the potential impact of aircraft movements on the community. On the premise of ensuring aviation safety, a number of aircraft noise mitigation measures have been implemented in accordance with international guidelines and practices, with a view to reducing the impact on neighbouring communities (including Tung Chung). Relevant measures include control at source by prohibiting/restricting aircrafts with higher noise levels from operating in Hong Kong, and reducing the number of flights overflying densely populated areas at night when weather and safety conditions permit, such as arranging arrival aircrafts to land from the southwest over the water, thereby mitigating the noise impact on residents living in the vicinity of the airport.
In respect of aircraft noise monitoring, the AA has, in accordance with the EP requirements, submitted and obtained approval from the EPD for the aircraft noise monitoring plan prior to the commissioning of the 3RS. The AA will continue carrying out relevant noise monitoring work in compliance with the EP requirements to confirm that runway usage arrangements comply with the aircraft noise standards stipulated by the EPD. In addition, the CAD has been utilising a computerised Aircraft Noise and Flight Track Monitoring System to collect noise data through multiple outdoor noise monitoring terminals set up along or close to the flight paths operating into and out of the HKIA. This reflects the aircraft noise situation in various districts, and the distribution of noise levels across districts is regularly published on the CAD website.
With advancement of aviation technology, aircrafts’ engines are quieter than before, and the improved design of airframe has also helped reduce the sound level generated by aircrafts. To encourage airlines to continuously upgrade their fleets and introduce aircrafts equipped with new navigation technologies for route operating to and from the HKIA, the CAD will grant priority use of relevant airport and runway facilities to aircrafts equipped with new navigation technologies, subject to weather and operational considerations. This aims to incentivise airlines to deploy such aircrafts on routes operating to and from the HKIA, thereby achieving more precise flight paths, optimising fleets and reducing the impact of aircraft noise on areas near flight paths. Meanwhile, the AA continues to encourage airlines to switch to and utilise a greater number of quieter new aircraft models through the “Noise Quota Count Scheme”, so as to manage night-time flights’ noise levels. Airlines are proactively and progressively upgrading their aircrafts, with the proportion of new-model aircraft in their fleets steadily rising, which will help reduce aircraft noise in the long run.
While consolidating and enhancing Hong Kong’s position as an international aviation hub, the Government will continue to balance community well-being and environmental benefits, proactively promoting the synergistic development of the aviation industry and the environment to achieve high-quality and sustainable growth.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region
Following is a question by the Hon Nixie Lam and a written reply by the Secretary for Education, Dr Choi Yuk-lin, in the Legislative Council today (June 3):
Question: The EDB has helped the Hong Kong Police Force promote the “Youth Crime Prevention Booklet” and “Child Protection Comic Book Series” through the EDB circular memoranda, and compiled the learning and teaching resource list to set out the related resources produced by other government departments and non-governmental organisations for teachers’ reference and use within and beyond the classroom. The above learning and teaching resources have been uploaded to the EDB webpage.
(5) The EDB attaches great importance to the professional quality of teachers and is committed to enhancing teachers’ professional competence through diversified professional development programmes and activities. The EDB has strengthened pre-service training for prospective teachers and have developed a guiding framework for teacher education programmes with teacher education universities, incorporating elements that promote the healthy growth of students. In addition, the current core training for in-service teachers covers two major categories, namely “Teachers’ Professional Roles, Values and Conduct” and “Local, National and International Education Issues”. “Prevention of School Bullying” falls under the category of “Local, National, and International Education Issues”. Schools can arrange relevant professional development activities for teachers according to their circumstances to enhance their knowledge and ability to prevent, identify and handle school bullying. To further enhance schools’ capacity to prevent and handle school bullying, the EDB continues to organise certificate courses on student guidance, courses for newly recruited student guidance personnel, and other related teacher training programmes, covering content related to school bullying.
Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4
The Leisure and Cultural Services Department announced today (June 3) that as the air conditioning system of the Exhibition Hall in the Hong Kong Science Museum ran out of order and urgent repair is being arranged, the museum is temporarily closed until further notice.